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                             OPINION 
                                           
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
         The question presented in this appeal is whether the 
district court properly applied the test set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 
(1982), as refined by Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. 
Ct. 3034 (1987), in denying summary judgment to twelve individual 
defendants on qualified immunity grounds.  Specifically, we must 
determine whether the district court improperly failed to analyze 
separately the specific conduct of each defendant in the context of 
determining whether plaintiffs had adduced evidence sufficient for 
a factfinder to conclude that a reasonable public official would 
have known that his or her conduct had violated clearly established 
constitutional rights.  Because we conclude that the district 
court's analysis was deficient, we will remand to the district 
court for a redetermination of the qualified immunity issue as to 
each individual City Defendant under the proper legal standard.  We 
also clarify the extent to which courts, in resolving qualified 
immunity on summary judgment, should consider the motivations of 
public officials when those motivations are an essential element of 
the underlying substantive constitutional claim. 
                                I. 
         The instant civil rights action arises out of actions 
taken by certain public officials in the City of Pittsburgh, 
primarily members of the City Council, Historic Review Commission 
and Planning Commission ("City Defendants"), and certain private 
individuals and organizations, in nominating two buildings for 
historic preservation under Pittsburgh's Historic Structures, 
District, Sites and Objects Ordinance.  Pittsburgh, Pa., Code Title 
1007, § 513.  That nomination prevented the buildings from being 
demolished and, thereby, thwarted plaintiffs William Grant's and 
Ike Harris' plans to develop the property on which the buildings 
were located.  Claiming to have lost $400,000 due to the 
nomination, Grant sought protection under Chapter Eleven of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
         On August 24, 1992, Grant and Harris filed a complaint in 
the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which 
was subsequently twice amended, alleging violations of their rights 
to equal protection of the laws, procedural and substantive due 
process, and asserting various theories of recovery under 
Pennsylvania common law.  They alleged, inter alia, that in acting 
upon the proposed nomination, the City Defendants were motivated 
not by the public interest but by partisan political or personal 
reasons having nothing to do with historic preservation.  
Specifically, the district court characterized the plaintiffs' 
allegations in the following manner: 
         Plaintiffs' central theory of the case is that 
         the private party defendants and the city 
         defendants orchestrated a scheme to thwart 
         plaintiffs' project in order to keep the 
         mayoral administration from receiving credit 
         in the upcoming election for the project's 
         projected economic revenue and jobs and to 
         assure that the property was developed by a 
         local developer. 
 
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 92-CV-1837, slip op. at 24-25 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1995). 
         The City Defendants initially moved to dismiss Grant's 
complaint and amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
raising among other issues the defense of qualified immunity.  On 
August 17, 1993, the district court issued an opinion and order 
granting in part and denying in part the City Defendants' motion; 
the district court rejected their claim of qualified immunity, and 
the City Defendants did not appeal that decision.  After engaging 
in considerable pretrial discovery, all defendants subsequently 
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs' evidence 
failed to demonstrate a disputed issue of material fact on 
liability.  Additionally, the City Defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. 
         On September 28, 1995, the district court issued an 
opinion and order granting summary judgment to the City Defendants 
on all theories of liability except substantive due process.  As to 
that theory of recovery, the district court stated that "[t]he 
instant record contains sufficient evidence from which the finder 
of fact could conclude that defendants' actions were undertaken for 
improper political motives and partisan political reasons."  Id. at 
40.  The court then cited evidence in the record suggesting that 
some City Defendants may have acted for improper purposes.  The 
district court did not address the qualified immunity issue. 
         The City Defendants therefore filed a motion requesting 
that the district court clarify its summary judgment ruling with 
respect to the issue of qualified immunity.  Approximately three 
weeks after handing down its summary judgment ruling, the district 
court granted the City Defendants' motion for clarification, but 
denied their claims of qualified immunity, ruling as follows: 
              Here, the substantive due process rights 
         allegedly violated by the City [D]efendants 
         clearly were established at the time of the 
         alleged violation. . . . At the time of the 
         alleged violation, it was well-settled in this 
         jurisdiction that the arbitrary and capricious 
         application of applicable law by an 
         administrative body violates an individual's 
         substantive due process rights.  Accordingly, 
         a reasonably competent public official would 
         have known that the alleged conduct violated 
         Grant's and Harris' substantive due process 
         rights.  In addition, plaintiffs have produced 
         affirmative evidence sufficient to create a 
         genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
         each City [D]efendant knowingly violated Grant 
         and Harris' substantive due process rights by 
         assisting in the administration of the 
         relevant ordinances for political or personal 
         motives unrelated to the merits of the matter 
         under consideration. 
 
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 92-CV-1837, slip op. at 3-4 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 16, 1995) (citations omitted).  This appeal followed. 
                               II. 
                                A. 
         The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343(a)(3).  To the extent that they turn on an issue of law, 
decisions denying public officials qualified immunity are 
considered final under the collateral order doctrine recognized in 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 
1221 (1949).  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 
2806 (1985); see also Johnson v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 
2151 (1995).  Because the question whether the district court 
applied the correct legal standard is purely one of law, we 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                B. 
         Plaintiffs contend, however, that the City Defendants' 
failure to appeal from the district court's denial of their Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, insofar as it rejected their claim of entitlement 
to qualified immunity, somehow divests us of our appellate 
jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs' contention is essentially that a party 
is not entitled to appeal the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment where that motion raises the same legal arguments as a 
prior motion to dismiss, and where that party has failed timely to 
appeal the denial of the prior motion.  This argument is without 
merit. 
         Plaintiffs cite three cases to support this proposition.  
The first of those, Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 
1984), is inapposite.  In that case, the defendants had made two 
motions for summary judgment that were both denied, the first based 
on absolute immunity and the second, made several years later, 
based on qualified immunity.  See id. at 1181-82.  The bulk of the 
court's opinion is concerned with rejecting the defendants' 
argument that the later ruling, on qualified immunity, is 
appealable on an interlocutory basis pursuant to the collateral 
order doctrine (Defendants' position ultimately was embraced, of 
course, by the Supreme Court in Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S. 
Ct. at 2817).  See id. at 1182-86.  In the remainder of the 
opinion, the court rejected the defendants' argument that they 
could appeal the denial of the earlier motion, even though that 
appeal would otherwise be untimely, on the ground that 
interlocutory appeals are not governed by the time provisions of 
Fed. R. App. P. 4.  See id. at 1186-87.  Nowhere in that opinion does 
the court intimate that it did not have jurisdiction over the later 
ruling because the defendants had failed to appeal the earlier 
ruling.  Indeed, the case would be an inappropriate vehicle for 
such a holding because the two rulings addressed different legal 
theories. 
         In Taylor v. Carter, 960 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1992), 
also cited by the plaintiffs, the defendants had attempted to 
appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment that had 
been made subsequent to a prior unsuccessful summary judgment 
motion based on the same legal grounds, and had failed to appeal 
the denial of the prior motion.  No such successive Rule 56 motions 
are at issue here. 
         In the third case cited by the plaintiffs, Armstrong v. 
Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 30 F.3d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 
1994), the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss, which was 
denied, and the defendants declined to appeal.  The defendants 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, but that motion 
was brought before discovery had been completed and the motion 
relied on no material outside the pleadings.  See id.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, although "brought 
under different rules and . . . guided by different standards of 
review," the two motions were functionally equivalent to one 
another because both were addressed solely to the pleadings and 
both raised the same legal arguments.  Id.  The court concluded 
that "[u]nder these unique circumstances" where "the two motions 
are substantially the same," it would not allow an appeal of a 
denial of the second motion.  Id. 
         Assuming without deciding that we would agree with the 
Fifth Circuit's analysis in Armstrong in an appropriate case, the 
"unique circumstances" identified in that case do not exist here.  
The motion for summary judgment in this case differed from the 
motion to dismiss in more than name only.  Though both relied on 
the same legal theory (qualified immunity), the second motion did 
not merely address the pleadings but also relied on matters 
obtained during extensive discovery.  Thus, the two motions are not 
"substantially the same," and the City Defendants' failure to 
appeal the denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not prevent 
this Court from exercising jurisdiction over their appeal from the 
denial of their Rule 56 motion. 
         This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's 
decision last Term in Behrens v. Pelletier, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. 
Ct. 834 (1996).  In Behrens, unlike this case, the defendants 
hadunsuccessfully appealed the district court's denial of their Rule 
12(b)(6) motion on qualified immunity grounds.  When they took a 
subsequent appeal from the district court's later denial of their 
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction.  Reversing, the Supreme Court held 
that "Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the 
defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the 
summary-judgment stage is a 'final' judgment subject to immediate 
appeal."  Id. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 839. 
         Although stated in terms of finality rather than 
timeliness, Behrens' holding, that a defendant who raises the 
defense of qualified immunity at both the dismissal and summary 
judgment stage of the proceedings is entitled to appeal adverse 
rulings each time, indicates a fortiori that there is nothing to 
prevent a defendant from appealing an adverse ruling issued at one 
stage but not the other. 
         Furthermore, adopting plaintiffs' position would have the 
effect of forcing every public official, as a prerequisite to 
taking an appeal from a potential subsequent order denying summary 
judgment, to appeal from the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  We 
decline to give our imprimatur to a rule that would dramatically 
increase the number of interlocutory appeals at the dismissal 
stage. 
         Accordingly, we hold that the City Defendants' failure to 
appeal at the dismissal stage poses no impediment to our appellate 
jurisdiction to review the district court's qualified immunity 
determination at the summary judgment stage. 
                               III. 
         Although we have appellate jurisdiction to review the 
district court's denial of the City Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the district court's 
failure to analyze the conduct of each individual defendant with 
respect to the constitutional right alleged to have been violated 
makes that task virtually impossible.  For the reasons we set forth 
in more detail below, we will remand this case to the district 
court to redetermine the qualified immunity issue with respect to 
the conduct of each individual defendant. 
                                A. 
                                1. 
         In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court set forth the 
applicable legal standard for qualified immunity: "government 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known."  457 U.S. 800, 818, 
102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).  Five years later, in Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987), the Court 
clarified the objective test it had propounded in Harlow.  The 
Court in Anderson held that to defeat qualified immunity it is not 
sufficient that the right at issue be clearly established as a 
general matter.  Rather, the question is whether a reasonable 
public official would know that his or her specific conductviolated 
clearly established rights.  Id. at 636-37, 107 S. Ct. at 
3037 (A "law enforcement officer who participates in a search that 
violates the Fourth Amendment may [not] be held personally liable 
for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that 
the search comported with the Fourth Amendment."). 
         Taking heed of the narrower focus required by Anderson(i.e., at 
the official's specific conduct, not just the right 
allegedly violated) is critical, for it can mean the difference 
between immunity from suit and being held personally liable for 
money damages.  We recognized the significance of Anderson for 
qualified immunity determinations in Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 
1097 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S. Ct. 2827 
(1991).  There, we interpreted Anderson to 
         require[] analysis not only of the clear 
         establishment of the right that an official is 
         alleged to have violated, but also of the 
         specific official actions alleged to have 
         violated the right.  Anderson thus appears to 
         require a court faced with whether a claim of 
         qualified immunity properly was denied to 
         engage in an analysis of the facts adduced 
         concerning the conduct of the official who 
         claims immunity. 
 
Id. 1111 (citations omitted).  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction § 8.6, at 478 (2d ed. 1994) ("The inquiry appears to be 
whether the officer had reason to know that the specific conduct 
was prohibited."). 
         In strong tension with Anderson's requirement that a 
court scrutinize the specific conduct at issue is the Supreme 
Court's admonition that qualified immunity be resolved as early in 
the litigation as possible.  "The overriding problem is the Supreme 
Court's insistence that the immunity defense be decided as a matter 
of law, when the reality is that factual issues must frequently be 
resolved in order to determine whether the defendant violated 
clearly established federal law."  Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 
in the Second Circuit, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 285, 309 (1993).  Thus, 
crucial to the resolution of any assertion of qualified immunity is 
a careful examination of the record (preferably by the district 
court) to establish, for purposes of summary judgment, a detailed 
factual description of the actions of each individual defendant 
(viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff).  See, e.g.,Johnson v. 
Jones, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (1995) 
(the "issue appealed concern[s], not which facts the parties might 
be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given factsshowed a 
violation of 'clearly established' law") (emphasis added). 
                                2. 
         In this case, the district court failed to rule on the 
City Defendants' assertions of qualified immunity in its summary 
judgment ruling.  After the City Defendants filed a motion for 
clarification, the district court addressed the qualified immunity 
issue in a separate opinion and order.  Although the district court 
correctly recited the legal principles governing its resolution of 
the qualified immunity issue under Harlow and Anderson, its 
analysis fell short of the fact-intensive inquiry those cases 
require. 
         Specifically, the district court stated in conclusory 
fashion that the right allegedly violated here--the substantive due 
process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative action--was clearly established: 
              Here, the substantive due process rights 
         allegedly violated by the City [D]efendants 
         clearly were established at the time of the 
         alleged violation. . . . At the time of the 
         alleged violation, it was well-settled in this 
         jurisdiction that the arbitrary and capricious 
         application of applicable law by an 
         administrative body violates an individual's 
         substantive due process rights. 
 
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 92-CV-1837, slip op. at 3-4 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 16, 1995).  But nowhere in its decision denying qualified 
immunity did the district court analyze the specific conduct of 
each City Defendant with respect to the constitutional right at 
issue.  See Brown, 922 F.2d at 1111. 
         At oral argument plaintiffs maintained that the district 
court's earlier decision denying summary judgment on the 
substantive due process claim contains a description of the 
individual City Defendants' specific conduct sufficiently detailed 
to support the district court's later decision denying qualified 
immunity en masse.  We disagree.  With respect to eight of the City 
Defendants--Raham, Armstrong, DeSantis, Eversmeyer, Downing, 
Wagner, Ferlo, and Ricciardi--the summary judgment ruling fails to 
set forth with enough specificity the conduct of each defendant 
that the district court thought sufficient to defeat qualified 
immunity.  See Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 92-CV-1837, slip 
op. at 22-24 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1995).  With respect to four other 
City Defendants--Cohen, Darkins, Madoff and Regan (members of the 
City Council who voted in favor of the designation)--the district 
court announced no findings whatsoever.  We will therefore remand 
this matter to the district court to reevaluate the City 
Defendants' claims of qualified immunity consistent with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Anderson and our decision in Brown.  
Cf. Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 903 F.2d 253, 257-59 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing our supervisory authority to remand unexplained grants 
of summary judgment for statement of reasons); Brown v. United 
States, 851 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A]lthough it is within 
our power to do so, it would be inappropriate for us to decide this 
question on appeal, even if the record provided a sufficient basis 
for its resolution.").  On remand the district court should analyze 
separately the conduct of each City Defendant against the 
constitutional right allegedly violated, i.e., the substantive due 
process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative decisionmaking. 
         We recognize, of course, that appeals from decisions 
denying summary judgment are subject to plenary review.  Thus, in 
the usual case a district court's failure to apply the correct 
legal standard would not preclude us from performing a de novoreview of 
the summary judgment record to determine whether there 
are material issues of fact in dispute.  Cf. Vadino, 903 F.2d at 
253 (recognizing supervisory authority to remand unexplained grants 
of summary judgment but reviewing decision de novo).  But with 
regard to appeals from denials of summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds our review is limited to determining "whether or 
not certain given facts showed a violation of 'clearly established' 
law."  Johnson v. Jones, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2155 
(emphasis added).  That standard presupposes that we have been 
provided with a set of "certain given facts" against which to 
measure the clearly established right allegedly violated.  Cf. 
Brown v. United States, 851 F.2d at 620.  We think that the 
district court, which has had this matter before it since August of 
1992, is in far better position than we are to review the record 
for evidence as to the specific conduct of each of the twelve City 
Defendants.  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819-20, 102 S. 
Ct. at 2739 ("We think it appropriate . . . to remand the case to 
the District Court for its reconsideration of this issue in light 
of this opinion.  The trial court is more familiar with the record 
so far developed and also is better situated to make any such 
further findings as may be necessary.") (footnote omitted); Hare v. 
City of Corinth, Mississippi, 74 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc) ("We leave to the district court the question whether there 
are genuine issues of material fact measured by the correct [legal] 
standard"); but see  Johnson, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2159 
("[W]e concede that a court of appeals may have to undertake a 
cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the 
district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
likely assumed.").  
                                B. 
         Another issue requires our attention.  The parties have 
devoted substantial briefing to the question whether, in applying 
Harlow's objective test for qualified immunity, a court may 
"consider" evidence of a defendant's state of mind when motivation 
is an essential element of the civil rights claim.  We hold that it 
can. 
         Harlow teaches that whether the City Defendants in fact 
knew that they were violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights is 
simply irrelevant to that analysis.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16, 
102 S. Ct. at 2736-37.  See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
517, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2810 (1985) (describing Harlow as having 
"purged qualified immunity of its subjective components").  It is 
now widely understood that a public official who knows he or she is 
violating the constitution nevertheless will be shielded by 
qualified immunity if a "reasonable public official" would not have 
known that his or her actions violated clearly established law. 
         The subjective inquiry that Harlow proscribes, however, 
is distinct from the question whether a public official, in taking 
official action that but for an improper motive would not be 
legally proscribed, in fact harbored the improper motive.  For 
purposes of clarity, when we use the terms "state of mind" and 
"motivation," we are referring to the state of mind element of the 
underlying offense, rather than to the question whether the public 
officials knew they were violating clearly established rights. 
         The City Defendants claim that under Harlow their 
subjective "political or personal motives" are irrelevant to the 
qualified immunity analysis.  The plaintiffs counter that the City 
Defendants' formulation of the qualified immunity standard would 
effectively prevent any plaintiff whose constitutional claim has as 
an essential element the state of mind of the public officials from 
ever getting past qualified immunity.   
         Although we have not directly addressed this issue, cf.Losch v. 
Borough of Parkesburg, Pennsylvania., 736 F.2d 903, 910 
(3d Cir. 1984) (defendants' reasonableness and good faith go to 
merits of plaintiff's retaliatory malicious prosecution claim), 
several of our sister circuits have.  Those courts have held, with 
virtual unanimity, that, despite the broad language of Harlow, 
courts are not barred from examining evidence of a defendant's 
state of mind in considering whether a plaintiff has adduced 
sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on the issue of 
qualified immunity, where such state of mind is an essential 
element of the constitutional violation itself.  See Crawford-El v. 
Britton, No. 94-7203, 1996 WL 480432 *3 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
("This circuit and others have understood Harlow to allow inquiry 
into subjective motivation where an otherwise constitutional act 
becomes unconstitutional only when performed with some sort of 
forbidden motive . . .."); Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294, 1298 
(1st Cir. 1993); F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 879 F.2d 1312, 1316 
(9th Cir. 1989); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 
1990) (en banc), cert. denied. 501 U.S. 1204, 111 S. Ct. 2796 
(1991); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 430-32 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989); Pueblo Neighborhood 
Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 647-48 (10th Cir. 
1988); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir. 1988). 
         In Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
the District of Columbia Circuit created an minor exception to this 
general rule.  Plaintiffs in Halperin alleged that a wiretap of 
their home violated the Fourth Amendment.  Defendants claimed 
qualified immunity on the basis that their actions were motivated 
by national security interests.  The court held that if the 
national security justification was reasonable, defendants' 
qualified immunity defense would prevail regardless of the 
defendants' actual states of mind.  In creating this exception, the 
D.C. Circuit explicitly justified its holding by referring to the 
special nature of national security cases.  The national security 
exception has not been expanded by the D.C. Circuit or by any other 
court ruling on this matter. 
         The substantive due process violation alleged in this 
case is precisely the sort of claim where "clearly established law 
makes the conduct legal or illegal depending upon the intent with 
which it is performed."  Id. at 184.  By their very nature, 
substantive due process claims of this kind involve the application 
of otherwise legitimate government machinery to achieve an 
illegitimate end.  When public officials invoke administrative 
processes for a legitimate purpose, they are acting in conformity 
with the Constitution and cannot be violating "clearly established" 
law (because they are not violating the law at all).  But when the 
same officials invoke administrative processes with an illicit 
purpose, they are violating substantive due process guarantees and, 
at the same time, "clearly established" law.  Qualified immunity 
is defeated not because the officials "in fact knew" that they were 
violating the Constitution, id. at 186, but because "reasonably 
competent public official[s]" who act with certain improper motives 
"should know the law [proscribes their] conduct."  Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 819, 102 S. Ct. at 2738 (emphasis added). 
         The purely objective inquiry advocated by the City 
Defendants would essentially insulate government officials from 
liability for the very harm our substantive due process precedents 
have sought to redress:  using government authority to take actions 
that, because of the improper motives of public officials, have no 
rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.  See 
generally Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for 
Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in 
Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126, 127 (1985) ("[B]ecause 
these suits often involve the intentional abuse of government 
power, the Harlow standard would deny redress to victims of 
precisely the kind of official misconduct that the civil rights 
remedy was primarily intended to address."). 
         We therefore join our sister circuits in adopting the 
narrower view of Harlow.  Accordingly, in evaluating a defense of 
qualified immunity, an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind 
is proper where such state of mind is an essential element of the 
underlying civil rights claim. 
                                2. 
         The City Defendants complain, however, that such a test 
is insufficient to weed out insubstantial claims at an early point 
in the litigation, in direct tension with the Court's decisions in 
Harlow, Mitchell, and Anderson.  Since the issue of state of mind 
will always be a question of fact that is "inextricably bound up 
with the merits," Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987), allegations of 
improper motive would mean that qualified immunity rarely, if ever, 
could be determined as a matter of law.  Accordingly, the City 
Defendants ask us to follow the lead of several of our sister 
circuits by imposing on civil rights plaintiffs some sort of 
"heightened" procedural burden in §1983 claims in which improper 
motive or intent is an essential element of the substantive 
constitutional claim.  See, e.g., Crawford-El, 1996 WL 480432, at 
*3. 
         We initially observe that the City Defendants are 
incorrect to the extent they argue that the issue of qualified 
immunity could never be determined as a matter of law without an 
increased procedural burden.  A district court could conclude (as 
could a court of appeals) that, even assuming that the public 
official acted with the improper intent, a reasonable public 
official would not have known that his or her specific conduct, 
taken with that intent, violated clearly established law.  Indeed, 
it is precisely because of this possibility that we are remanding 
this matter to the district court for a conduct-specific analysis 
of the qualified immunity issue as it applies to each defendant.   
         Nevertheless, we agree that a per se denial of qualified 
immunity, whenever a plaintiff has alleged improper motive or 
intent, might inadequately cloak officials from vexatious lawsuits 
and unnecessary interference with the exercise of their public 
duties.  We further recognize that intent-based claims are 
particularly vulnerable to groundless allegations by the plaintiff 
which in turn might lead to time-consuming discovery.  We believe 
nevertheless that Fed. R. Civ. P.  56, as well as the principles 
expounded by the Supreme Court in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986), adequately protect defendants from 
unfounded claims.  We are, after all, attempting to balance the 
defendants' need for protection from unfounded claims and vexatious 
litigation, with the plaintiff's rights to vindicate his or her 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.  We think that Rule 56 strikes 
the best compromise between these two competing interests. 
         First, Celotex clearly states that the moving party bears 
no burden of disproving unsupported claims.  See Celotex, 477 U.S. 
at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.  Thus, the defendant officer need only 
identify those claims that are deficient within the complaint, 
without engaging in a lengthy defense of his conduct.  Coupled with 
a district court's reasonable limitation on discovery, Celotex 
adequately protects public officials from groundless allegations of 
"bad" intent.  The Fifth Circuit agreed with this position in 
Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 608 (5th Cir. 1994), in which it 
held that a teacher could rely on circumstantial as well as direct 
evidence to prove unconstitutional motive in opposing a summary 
judgment motion, thereby rejecting the defendant's request for a 
heightened standard of proof for summary judgment:  "[W]e are 
convinced that the requirements of Rule 56 accommodate the 
interests of public officials seeking protection from groundless 
claims as well as the interests of plaintiffs seeking vindication 
of constitutional rights."  Other circuits have taken this approach 
as well. See Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Education, 926 F.2d 505, 512 
(6th Cir. 1991); Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 47- 
48 (1st Cir. 1988); cf. Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1083-1084 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (adopting "heightened" standard but noting court's doubt 
that standard "imposes a burden greater than is already required 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56"). 
         Finally, we note that a heightened summary judgment 
standard is not only unnecessary, but also undesirable in light of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,  
477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), which held that the burden of 
proof at the summary judgment stage and the trial stage are 
identical. 
                               IV. 
         We will remand this case to the district court to 
reevaluate the City Defendants' claims of qualified immunity 
consistent with this opinion.  The district court should take care 
to analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the 
specific conduct of each individual City Defendant, including his 
or her motives. 
         Each party to bear its own costs. 
 
 
 
 
